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Jizang (吉藏, 549−623) is the principal philosophical exponent of the San-
lun (三論) tradition of Chinese Buddhism and is the most creative and 
important Chinese Mādhyamika thinker. In developing his philosophy, 
he drew to a great extent on his reading of the works of Nāgārjuna (c. 
150−250), the founder of the Madhyamaka school of Indian Buddhism, 
and some other Indian Mādhyamikas. His thinking was also shaped by 
the ideas and teachings of several Sanlun thinkers before him, chiefly 
Sengzhao (僧肇, 374?−414), Sengquan (僧詮, d.u, early fifth century), and 
Falang (法朗, 507−581). Most notable among these thinkers was Seng-
zhao. A key forerunner of the Sanlun tradition, Sengzhao set the tone for 
the development of Sanlun thought with his widely influential work, the 
Zhao lun (肇論). He was influenced in his philosophical thinking and 
phrasing by the contemporary current of thought known as “arcane 
learning” (xuanxue 玄學). Jizang, by contrast, may appear consciously to 
distance himself from non-Buddhist Chinese thought. However, inheri-
ting a tradition of somewhat Sinicized Mādhyamika thought, Jizang’s 
own philosophy remains different in a few aspects from that of Indian 
Madhyamaka. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
1 I would like to thank the following scholars for their critical comments and helpful sug-
gestions on previous versions of this paper: Chen-kuo Lin, Dan Lusthaus, Shoryu Katsu-
ra, Hans-Rudolf Kantor, and Michael Radich. 
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According to Jizang, all things are empty of determinate form or 
nature. For him, much of what things are taken to be is such only rela-
tive to the current situation and the observer’s conceptual scheme or 
perspective; there is no ultimate, perspective-free determination of 
things as they truly are. We may thus ascribe to Jizang the indetermina-
cy thesis, such that all things are ontologically indeterminate: given any 
x, no linguistic item can truly and conclusively be applied to x in the 
sense of positing a determinate form or nature therein. 
Jizang’s philosophy of ontic indeterminacy is connected closely with 
his views on the Way (dao 道) and nonacquisition (wude 無得).2 In his 
construal of the Indian Mādhyamika doctrine of twofold truth, the con-
ventional and supreme truths are actually two expedient teachings 
meant to make explicit the Way, which seems to be a kind of ineffable 
principle (li 理) of actuality. However, Jizang also equates the Way with 
nonacquisition, which is roughly a conscious state of freedom from any 
attachment and definite understanding whatsoever.3 The issue then be-
comes pressing as to how we are to understand Jizang’s notion of the 
Way. Does it indicate some metaphysical principle or reality? Is it actu-
ally a skillful expedient to lead one to the consummate state of complete 
spiritual freedom? Again, how is this issue related to Jizang’s conception 
of ontic indeterminacy? Unlike Nāgārjuna, whose works have been stu-
died intensively by modern scholars, Jizang’s philosophy has received 
only scant attention. Herein, I examine Jizang’s key writings in an at-
tempt to clarify his ontological position. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
2 Jizang’s notion of nonacquisition will be explained in Section 3. Briefly, the terms 
“nonacquisition”, “nonabidingness” (wuzhu 無住), “nonattachment” (wuzhi 無執), and 
“nondependence” (wuyi 無依) are, for him, interchangeable; see his Bai lun shu (百論
疏), T42:1827.234c21–22. Given this interchangeability, and because Jizang occasionally 
couples “nonacquisition” with “correct intuition” (zhengguan 正觀), it would seem that 
the notion concerns a certain conscious state of mind. 
3 Definite understanding (jueding jie 決定解) is basically people’s conventional under-
standing that takes things as definitely such and such. Regarding the Mādhyamika no-
tion of linguistic fabrication (prapañca) as a root cause of our being entangled in the 
cycle of rebirth, Jizang distinguishes between linguistic fabrication (xilun 戲論) based 
on craving and that based on understanding: the former concerns people’s grasping at-
tachment to things, the latter refers to people’s definite understanding. See Zhongguan 
lun shu (中觀論疏), T42:1824.12b25−27. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I 
first elucidate briefly Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of emptiness, and then, in 
view of the remarkable resemblances between Sengzhao’s and Jizang’s 
Sanlun thought, I elaborate on Sengzhao’s interpretation of the doctrine. 
In Section 3, I discuss and examine Jizang’s philosophy in relation to 
nonacquisition and ontic indeterminacy. Section 4 deals with the central 
issue of this paper; here, I offer a sustained analysis of Jizang’s notion of 
the Way, in order to clarify his ontological position. Section 5 concludes 
the paper with final remarks. 
2 
As noted above, Sengzhao had a tremendous influence on the subse-
quent development of the Sanlun tradition, so it is advisable in any in-
vestigation of Jizang’s thought first to present Sengzhao’s. Now, both Ji-
zang’s and Sengzhao’s thought owe a great debt to the works of early In-
dian Mādhyamika thinkers, so we first review the doctrine of emptiness 
propounded by Nāgārjuna in his magnum opus, the Mūlamadhyama-
ka-kārikā. 
For Nāgārjuna, all things originate dependently (pratītyasamutpanna) 
in that their coming to be, changing, and perishing depend on various 
causes and conditions. The relationship of dependency includes not only 
sequential causal relations, and mereological relations between an object 
and its parts, but also relations of notional codependence.4 On the 
ground that they originate dependently, things are said to be empty 
(śūnya) in the sense of being devoid of self-nature (svabhāva) where by 
“self-nature” Nāgārjuna means, roughly, a self-existent, causally uncon-
ditioned, and unchanging nature or existence that a thing may be 
believed to possess. In his view, putative self-natures are conceptual con-
structs that are illicitly reified and embedded in the world. 
Significantly, the dependent origination and consequential emptiness 
of a thing strips it of any unchanging, substantial ground, and allows its 
-------------------------------------------------- 
4 Nagao (Nagao, 1989: 12, 40) takes the relationship to be mutual relativity and depen-
dence (parasparāpekṣā). For a discussion of notional dependence, see Westerhoff, 2009: 
26−29, 95−98. 
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deeply illusory character to be recognized. Thus, Nāgārjuna resorts to 
the analogies of a phantom, a dream, a reflection, bubbles, and so forth, 
to indicate the ultimately illusory character of things. However, he 
upholds a doctrine of twofold truth, which draws a thin line between su-
preme truth (paramārthasatya) and conventional truth (saṃvṛtisatya). 
From the perspective of conventional truth, things in the world are (con-
ventionally) real. It is only from the perspective of supreme truth that 
they are said to be illusory. 
For Nāgārjuna, it seems, supreme truth is simply Suchness (tattva) as 
the true nature of things, the way things really are, the characteristics of 
which are indicated in MMK 18.7, 18.9 to be that they are ineffable, in-
conceivable, quiescent, and undifferentiated. Later Mādhyamikas equate 
Suchness with emptiness. However, Nāgārjuna also holds that emptiness 
is itself empty. This, above all, has led a number of contemporary scho-
lars to interpret him as repudiating anything metaphysical and to con-
tend on his behalf that the supreme truth is that there is no supreme 
truth, that there is no such thing as the way things really are (Siderits, 
1989; Garfield, 2002; Westerhoff, 2009). This interpretation is in direct 
contrast to the metaphysical interpretation, adopted by some scholars, 
that takes Suchness to be an objective reality or principle, the intuition 
of which can bear one across the ocean of saṃsāra. However, I shall not 
discuss this intricate issue here (see Ho, 2012). 
Kumārajīva (鳩摩羅什, 344−413), a prestigious scholar and translator 
of Indian extraction, and a teacher of Sengzhao, translated into Chinese 
the MMK together with a commentary attributed to an Indian commen-
tator named *Piṅgala (青目). The resultant work is known as the Zhong 
lun (中論), the Middle Treatise. Remarkably, Kumārajīva translates the 
Sanskrit term svabhāva in the MMK as “determinate nature” (dingxing 定
性) as well as as “self-nature” (zixing 自性). In addition, he uses the term 
“determinate form” (dingxiang 定相) not infrequently in his translation 
of the commentary.5 Such usages must have influenced the direction of 
-------------------------------------------------- 
5 The use of the term “determinate” to refer to things of self-nature may be Kumārajīva’s 
own idea. Both “determinate nature” and “determinate form” occur in his Chinese 
translation of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra, the Weimojie suoshuo jing (維摩詰所說經). 
However, the corresponding passages in the extant Sanskrit text of the sūtra contain no 
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Chinese Mādhyamika thinking. For Sengzhao, the myriad things, when 
apprehended by the mind or intellect, appear to have various forms, 
which prompt people to use nominal words to designate them. However, 
they are codependent, nonsubstantial, and devoid of any determinate 
form or nature; they are then said to be empty and nonreal. A human 
face, for instance, is neither beautiful nor ugly in itself. It is through de-
lusional conception that we apprehend in it a determinate form, cognize 
it as definitely beautiful or otherwise, and come to have an attachment 
thereto.6 
In Sengzhao’s system, there is no ready-made mind-independent 
world with a determinate structure that empirical investigation can re-
veal to us, a world that houses properly sliced res waiting to be labeled 
accurately by the corresponding words. The way the myriad things 
ordinarily appear to us is already saturated with concepts, which yet 
cannot accurately represent the way things really are. Following Indian 
Madhyamaka, Sengzhao emphasizes the notion of notional codepen-
dence. We know that many concepts are interdependent and comple-
mentary, forming such pairs as “long” and “short”, “something” and 
“nothing”, “life” and “death”, and so on. Indeed, given any word X, we 
can always coin a word, say, non-X to form a pair of codependents. Just as 
Nāgārjuna takes a father and a son to be interdependent, Sengzhao 
claims that there is no existence without nonexistence, and no nonexis-
tence without existence.7 This claim probably derives from the idea that, 
-------------------------------------------------- 
word that expresses the sense of determinacy. See T14:475.545a12, 548b25−27, and Vi-
malakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra, 2006: 50, 73. 
6 Nowadays, many would think that being beautiful is not a property of objects, but 
merely the content of a subjective judgment that may vary from person to person. 
However, I use the example to retain the flavor of the original thought. See Zhu Weimo-
jie jing (注維摩詰經), T38:1775.386b18−20, 389b21−22; Zhao lun, T45:1858.156b17−18, 159
b‌20−21. Among the four essays in the Zhao lun that are traditionally attributed to Seng-
zhao, the authenticity of the essay “Nirvāṇa Is Nameless” has been questioned by a few 
contemporary scholars. I concur with many others that the essay was basically penned 
by Sengzhao himself. 
7 Such a claim does not merely concern notional dependence; see Zhao lun, T45:1858.159
a27−b3, and Zhu Weimojie jing, T38:1775.332c29−333a2, 348c13−16. Thus, it may appear to 
conflate existential dependence and notional dependence. 
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given the ubiquity of concepts in our daily experience, we cannot really 
bypass notional codependence and focus solely on existential causality 
in order to attend to things in the world. Thus, we can cognize some-
thing as existent, involving the concept of existence, only when we are 
aware of nonexistent items of which the concept of nonexistence can be 
predicated. Consequently, or so it seems, there is no existence without 
nonexistence, and vice versa. 
It is presumably on such grounds, together with the thought that 
words cannot match anything real, that Sengzhao argues for the nonre-
ality of all things:8 
The Zhong lun says, “Things are neither this nor that.”9 Yet, one per-
son takes this to be this and that to be that, while another takes this to 
be that and that to be this. This and that are not determined by one 
word [say, “this” or “that”], but deluded people think they must be so. 
Thus, this and that are originally nonexistent, whereas to the deluded 
they are existent from the beginning. Once we realize that this and 
that do not exist, then, is there anything that can be considered exis-
tent? Thus, we know that the myriad things are not real; they have al-
ways been provisional appellations! 
A thing may be referred to by the demonstrative “this” and taken by the 
speaker as this. Yet, it would be the referent of “that” and taken as that in 
respect of another speaker some distance away. The thing is not fixed by 
“this” or “that”, not definitely this or that. Sengzhao can then apply this 
observation to all referential expressions and their intended referents. 
Things conventionally referred to by the word X are not to be determin-
ed by the word: they are not things endowed with a determinate X-form. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
8 Zhao lun, T45:1858.152c23−28: 中觀云，物無彼此。而人以此為此，以彼為彼，彼亦以
此為彼，以彼為此。此彼莫定乎一名，而惑者懷必然之志。然則，彼此初非有，惑
者初非無。既悟彼此之非有，有何物而可有哉？故知萬物非真，假號久矣. Incidentally, 
it is not my purpose here to examine the soundness of Sengzhao’s argumentation. 
9 It is stated in Piṅgala’s commentary that “There is in the real nature of things neither 
this nor that;” see T30:1564.30c8: 諸法實相無有此彼. However, the idea expressed 
here is rather reminiscent of a passage in the Zhuangzi (莊子); see Zhuangzi yinde 4/2/
27−33. 
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They are not definitely so and so, and there cannot be any sharp demar-
cation between them and things referred to by the word non-X. 
From the ontic indeterminacy of things, Sengzhao appears to con-
clude, rather hastily, their nonexistence. However, his overall philoso-
phy does not support such a one-sided conclusion. For him, the myriad 
things are neither existent nor nonexistent, though they can be said pro-
visionally to be existent and nonexistent. They can be said to be non-
existent on the grounds that they are codependent and empty of perma-
nent and determinate nature. They can be said to be existent because 
they arise endowed with forms and are responsive to causal conditions. 
They are neither permanent entities nor sheer nothings (Zhao lun, T45:
1858.152b18−c20, 156b11−13; Zhu Weimojie jing, T38:1775.332c27−29). 
Therefore, we should read the above-quoted passage as primarily assert-
ing the nonexistence of things qua linguistically determined. Since the 
myriad things, unlike the ineffable supreme truth discussed below, are 
properly expressible and so tend to be mistaken as determinate, they are 
here provisionally said to be not real. 
Meanwhile, Sengzhao appears to acknowledge the completely quies-
cent true nature of the myriad things, which is typically termed supreme 
truth (zhendi 真諦). This supreme truth is characterized as formless, 
nameless, and real, which means that it is conceptually indeterminable. 
It is said that a sage’s sacred mind illuminates formless supreme truth. 
Thus, we seem to arrive at something as how things really are, indepen-
dent of the concepts we happen to employ. As the way things really are 
goes beyond the grip of concepts, it is simultaneously structureless, per-
haps like an amorphous lump, to be carved up using our conceptual 
scheme into the things that we take to be constitutive of our world. 
Significantly, Sengzhao’s stance is to emphasize the nonduality of the 
way of supreme truth and the myriad things of conventional truth (sudi 
俗諦). For him, the fact of there being two truths does not dictate that 
there be two types of thing. Equating the supreme and conventional 
truth respectively with nonacquisition and acquisition (youde 有得),10 
-------------------------------------------------- 
10 In Sengzhao’s writings, the word “acquisition” basically means the delusional-concep-
tual obtention of something that is taken as real and is an object of attachment. The 
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he contends that the two principles designated by the two terms, “non-
acquisition” and “acquisition”, are not different.11 This may explain why 
Sengzhao famously avers that people have the real (zhen 真) right be-
fore their eyes without their knowing it, and that the real is precisely 
where we are in contact with things (Zhao lun, T45:1858.151a27−28, 153
a4−5). 
As we just saw, Sengzhao seems to equate supreme truth with nonac-
quisition, and conventional truth with acquisition. He states, elsewhere, 
that the real arises by dint of nonattachment, whereas the unreal occurs 
on account of attachment. He repudiates any acquisition of nonacquisi-
tion. All this indicates that Sengzhao may deny the existence of any 
higher reality or objective truth, and affirm and find soteriological value 
only in the subjective state of freedom from any acquisition whatsoever. 
However, it is also implied in the Zhao lun that supreme truth is the inef-
fable and formless principle, the profoundly quiescent pinnacle of all 
things, which is to be illuminated by the sacred mind. This is a puzzling 
issue, similar to the one we mentioned at the beginning of the paper in 
respect of Jizang’s notion of the Way. The difficulty of resolving the issue 
lies in the fact that Sengzhao does not explain his notion of supreme 
truth in detail. 
The best way to solve the problem, I believe, is by considering Seng-
zhao’s understanding of the notion of nirvāṇa, because the latter pre-
sumably concerns that which is considered ultimate in his philosophy. 
Indeed, he cites approvingly a line from a sūtra to the effect that su-
preme truth is the way of nirvāṇa.12 Sengzhao discusses nirvāṇa fairly ex-
-------------------------------------------------- 
word “nonacquisition”, by contrast, signifies the absence of such obtention. See Zhu 
Weimojie jing, T38:1775.377c18−26, and Zhao lun, T45:1858.161b1−4. 
11 Zhao lun, T45:1858.152b12−18. It would seem that the two truths are two principles. In 
any case, I here use the word “truth” in a nonstandard sense such that supreme truth 
can be characterized as formless and nameless. 
12 Zhao lun, T45:1858.159a26−27. It is here said that conventional truth consists of exis-
tent and nonexistent things. 
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tensively, so we are in a position to ascertain his conception of supreme 
truth. In this context, the following passage is the most noteworthy:13 
Things [in reality] have no form of existence or nonexistence. Sages 
have no knowing of existence or nonexistence…There is no figure 
outside [us], no [objectifying] mind in within. Both [exterior and inte-
rior] are quiescently ceased; both things and oneself are harmonious-
ly one. Being tranquil and traceless, this state is termed nirvāṇa. 
Clearly, Sengzhao takes nirvāṇa to be a state of quiescence in which one-
self and things, heaven and earth, and even past and present, are undif-
ferentially equal and harmoniously one. Here, presumably, the myriad 
things lose their identities; there is nothing to be acquired, not even 
nonacquisition itself.14 
Arguably, Sengzhao’s notion of supreme truth signifies such a non-
dual and indeterminable state of quiescence. If so, supreme truth is 
formless, without being an objective, higher reality. It can be charac-
terized as nonacquisition, and yet is not purely mental or subjective. 
This observation provides us with a significant clue for interpreting Ji-
zang’s notion of the Way. 
3 
Just as Nāgārjuna sought to render explicit some implications of the 
Buddha’s teaching about the causally conditioned state of things by em-
phasizing their emptiness, Jizang deepened Nāgārjuna’s teaching about 
the emptiness of things by highlighting nonacquisition as the main in-
tention behind all Mahāyāna scriptures.15 The term “nonacquisition” 
-------------------------------------------------- 
13 Zhao lun, T45:1858.159c8−11: 法無有無之相，聖無有無之知…於外無數，於內無心。
彼此寂滅，物我冥一，怕爾無朕，乃曰涅槃. See also T45:1858.161a17−19, 161b7−9. 
14 However, given the nonduality of supreme truth and conventional truth, the identities 
of the myriad things are not really erased. Thus, Sengzhao speaks of a sage’s mind mir-
roring all things as they are, while he also realizes the quiescent oneness of himself 
and the things; see Zhu Weimojie jing, T38:1775.372c19−24. 
15 While, as hinted in MMK 24.18 and Lindtner, 1987: 65, v. 68, Nāgārjuna construes the 
Buddha’s notion of dependent origination as emptiness, Jizang, in his Erdi yi (二諦義), 
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recurs in Kumārajīva’s translations of Mahāyāna sūtras. There, it often 
implies that because all things are in reality empty and illusory, there is 
no real and substantial thing as such that can be conceptually appre-
hended, or even attained.16 In Jizang’s thought, to have acquisition with 
respect to a thing is to take it as having a determinate and substantial 
nature such that one abides in its presumed determinate reality and 
depends on that reality in daily life, thereby becoming attached to it and 
losing one’s spiritual freedom.17 Alternatively, to have acquisition with 
respect to a view is to affirm it as definitely true of reality and become 
attached to it. Jizang is emphatic that one must not abide in, or attach 
oneself to, anything in a spirit of acquisition. 
For Jizang, just as for Sengzhao, the myriad things are ontologically 
indeterminate. One and the same thing can be existent for an ordinary 
unenlightened person, yet nonexistent for a sage. It may look impure 
and disgusting to a human, yet pure and attractive to an animal (Erdi yi, 
T45:1854.81b6–8; Jingming xuan lun [淨名玄論], T38:1780.897a14–29). In-
deed, what one human being takes to be a tree may be just food for tree-
eating bugs, a post ablaze for some meditating yogis, or a great mass of 
particles of indeterminate nature for a stubborn quantum physicist. 
Thus, much of what things are taken to be is such only relative to the 
-------------------------------------------------- 
takes Nāgārjuna’s notion of emptiness to be synonymous with nonacquisition. See T45:
‌1854.106a18. 
16 The Sanskrit words for “nonacquisition”, anupalambha and anupalabdhi, generally 
mean non-perception or non-apprehension. In a passage of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra, 
the word anupalambha signifies not having any view (dṛṣṭi) of oneself and other things; 
see Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra, 2006: 50. Jizang understands the term “nonacquisition” 
somewhat differently. Commenting on the Weimojie suoshuo jing, and basing himself on 
Sengzhao’s interpretation, he takes the term to mean the mind’s nonobtention of all 
dharmas, especially delusional conception and external things. See Weimo jing yishu (維
摩經義疏), T38:1781.959b4−10. Moreover, as noted above, the terms “nonacquisition”, 
“nonabidingness”, “nonattachment”, and “nondependence” are, for him, interchange-
able. Here, Jizang might be influenced by the Indian Mādhyamika text, the Dazhidu lun 
(大智度論), wherein it is said, in T25:1509.501c4, that when the mind has no attach-
ment to dual and nondual dharmas, this is called nonacquisition. My thanks to an anony-
mous reviewer for pushing me to clarify this issue. 
17 The notion of dependence here is used not in the Nāgārjunian sense, but as indicating 
the opposite of spiritual freedom. 
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current situation and the observer’s conceptual scheme or perspective; 
there is no ultimate, perspective-free and context-free determination of 
things as they truly are. Here, to take a thing to be determinate is to deli-
neate it, setting it in opposition to other things, which results in harmful 
dualistic views about things. Meanwhile, Jizang’s contention that what 
we take to be things are not really different from the ineffable, indeter-
minable middle Way also reinforces the indeterminacy thesis that we 
have ascribed to him. 
Now, if the two truths in Nāgārjuna’s doctrine are taken as singly de-
terminate and mutually distinct principles of actuality, there is a strong 
temptation to treat them as objects of acquisition and become attached 
to them.18 For those who have not yet begun to follow the path to libe-
ration, attachment to conventional truth is the de facto mode of being, 
whereas those who are already on the path will be tempted to attach 
themselves to supreme truth; meanwhile, those who misconstrue the 
doctrine may become attached to both of the truths. In order to counter 
acquisition and attachment, Jizang avers that the two truths are just two 
provisional, expedient teachings meant to make explicit the nondual 
middle Way, which is neither supreme nor conventional:19 
The reason for taking the middle Way to be the body (ti 體) of the two 
truths is that the two truths are meant to make explicit the nondual 
principle. As when one points toward the moon with a finger, his in-
tention is not to highlight the finger, but to let others see the moon, 
so also with the teaching of the twofold truth. The two truths are 
meant to make explicit the nondual; the intention is not in the duality, 
-------------------------------------------------- 
18 Erdi yi, T45:1854.108c17–23; Jizang here quotes from a Buddhist sūtra a statement that 
equates a view of acquisition with a dualistic view. In his Dasheng xuan lun (大乘玄論), 
T45:1853.30a16–17, Jizang cites from a Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra to the effect that those who 
embrace duality follow acquisition, while those who embrace no duality follow nonac-
quisition. 
19 Erdi yi, T45:1854.108b22–25: 所以明中道為二諦體者，二諦為表不二之理。如指指月，
意不在指，意令得月，二諦教亦爾。二諦為表不二，意不在二，為令得於不二。是
故，以不二為二諦體. Notably, Jizang also takes supreme and conventional truth to be 
two objective spheres of principle, namely, emptiness and existence respectively; see Er-
di yi, T45:1854.97b4–13 and Zhongguan lun shu, T42:1824.28c28–29a3. The two principles 
are interdependent, and so are both provisional. 
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but to enable others to access the nondual. Thus, we take the nondual 
[principle] to be the body of the two truths. 
Here, the Way is variously named the correct Way (zhengdao 正道), the 
nondual principle, the correct principle, the Real (shixiang 實相), and so 
forth. Significantly, it is also equated with nonabidingness, nonacquisi-
tion or the like. 
In line with his emphasis on nonacquisition, Jizang proposes the doc-
trines of “three levels of the two truths” and “four levels of the two 
truths”. The main concern here is to oppose any definite understanding 
that views the referent of a term as determinate in nature and determi-
nable by the term; such a referent is an object for acquisition and attach-
ment. At the first level, Jizang takes existence and emptiness to be the con-
ventional and supreme truths, respectively. To counter people’s prob-
able determination and acquisition of emptiness, duality of existence and 
emptiness is regarded as the conventional truth at the second level, while 
nonduality of existence and emptiness is the supreme truth at this level. At 
this level, one may make the mistake of delineating nonduality from dual-
ity, treating it as determinate, and becoming attached to it. Against such 
a practice, Jizang takes both duality and nonduality to be the conventional 
truth at the third level and regards neither duality nor nonduality as the su-
preme truth at this level. Even so, one may come to have acquisition in 
respect of the supreme truth at this third level. Thus, finally, all the 
truths of the three levels are said to be the conventional truth at the 
fourth level, which indicates that they are expedient teachings for peda-
gogic and therapeutic purposes, while the supreme truth at this level is 
the state or principle of forgetting speech and ceasing thought (yan wang 
lü jue 言忘慮絕). 
Jizang, it seems, is here distinguishing between teaching and prin-
ciple. Whatever truth can be expressed in language belongs to the do-
main of teaching, which coincides with the conventional truth of the 
fourth level; by contrast, the supreme truth of this level, which lies be-
yond the reach of words, is the ineffable principle of nonacquisition. The 
distinction between teaching and principle, then, corresponds to that 
between what can be said using language and what cannot. A parallel 
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distinction holds between what Jizang refers to as the provisional (jia 
假) and the middle (zhong 中). 
For Jizang, the myriad things are codependent, indeterminate, and 
interrelated. He highlights the role that notional codependence plays in 
our understanding of things. Since the words X and non-X are notionally 
codependent, X and non-X, which are signified by these words, respec-
tively, are not definitely X and non-X, that is, they are not what is de-
marcated and determined by the words when considered independently. 
For example, speech is speech only relative to silence (or nonspeech). It 
cannot be identified and fixed by the word “speech” independently, 
without regard to silence as signified by the word “silence”. It is not 
something fittingly determined by “speech” and definitely differentiated 
from silence. Thus, speech is not definitely speech and not definitely dif-
ferent from silence; and likewise for silence. Similarly, existence and 
emptiness, being notionally interdependent, are not definitely existence 
and emptiness. Rather, the one is provisional existence, the other provi-
sional emptiness.20 
The notion of the provisional refers to that which is interdependent, 
nonreal, indeterminate, and conceptually differentiated. The provisional 
X is not definitely X, and the provisional non-X not definitely non-X; 
they are only provisionally said to be X and non-X. According to Jizang, 
however, they also point to a state that is neither X nor non-X, which is 
the middle as the ineffable, real, and ever-indeterminable Way.21 
Now, we may approach the middle conceptually or nonconceptually. 
If we approach it conceptually, then the middle, being notionally depen-
dent on the provisional, is simply provisional in character. Beyond this 
again, however, the middle and the provisional in turn point to a state 
that is neither middle nor provisional. So long as we are engaged in dis-
cussion like the present discussion, of course, we cannot really approach 
-------------------------------------------------- 
20 Dasheng xuan lun, T45:1853.24a9−14. As noted above, existence and emptiness can be 
regarded as conventional and supreme truth respectively. Here, the two truths are 
provisional in character. 
21 Zhongguan lun shu, T42:1824.61c25: “Only this one principle [of the Real] is designated 
as real; all else is illusory” (唯此一理名之為實，自斯以外並皆虛妄). Yang (1989: 130) 
takes this statement to show that Jizang affirms the existence of an absolute truth. 
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the middle nonconceptually. However, we can at least assume that we 
are referring to the middle as such, taken precisely as the aforesaid state 
of forgetting speech and ceasing thought. Here, based on textual evi-
dence such as MMK 24.18, Jizang proclaims the nonduality of the middle 
and the provisional, which amounts to the nonduality of the Real and the 
illusory, and of what cannot be said using language and what can be so 
said. Indeed, to draw a clear-cut distinction between the middle and the 
provisional is to delineate them and fall prey to a harmful dualistic 
thinking. Jizang’s philosophical practice aims at transcending all types of 
dualistic thought. Just like Sengzhao, he dismisses as inadmissible any 
acquisition of nonacquisition. 
4 
We began this paper with the question of how to understand Jizang’s 
notion of the Way. Does it indicate some metaphysical principle or real-
ity? Or is it rather a useful expedient to lead one to the consummate 
state of complete nonacquisition? Apart from equating the Way with 
nonacquisition, Jizang appears to take the correct principle to be a state 
of mind in which any form of teaching, whether Buddhist or not, is qui-
escent. In addition, he refers to the Real as the complete nondependent 
state of the mind that is free from any judgment (San lun xuanyi [三論玄
義], T45:1852.6c12–16; Zhongguan lun shu, T42:1824.124a4–5). All this sug-
gests that he probably dispenses with any notion of higher reality and 
attends merely to the subjective state of complete freedom from any ac-
quisition whatsoever. This explains his therapeutic use of words and his 
claim that once one has freed oneself from acquisition, nonacquisition 
must be relinquished as well. 
According to Hsueh-li Cheng, the Mādhyamika notion of emptiness is 
mainly a soteriological device that is meant to empty the mind of crav-
ings and to suggest that enlightenment is the abandonment of concep-
tual thinking. In his view, for Jizang and other Sanlun thinkers, no reality 
is really real, no truth is truly true. All truths taught by the Buddha are 
merely provisional instruments used to eradicate extreme views; they 
are pragmatic in nature and eventually must be dispensed with (Cheng, 
1984: 53, 98–99). Endorsing a similar position, Ming-Wood Liu writes, 
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In thus making non-attachment the sole criterion of truth, [Jizang] 
empties the concept of truth of any determinate content. And if he 
still refers to some statements and beliefs as true, he makes it perfect-
ly plain that his primary consideration is their efficacy in refuting 
false views and cultivating non-attachment (Liu, 1994: 103). 
Liu points out that for Jizang, words such as “Way” and “principle” ex-
press only the spirit of nonacquisition, rather than any ineffable abso-
lute Way or principle. Indeed, to think otherwise and to affirm the Way 
or principle as real would only contravene the spirit of nonacquisition 
itself. 
Both Cheng and Liu rightly highlight the therapeutic and pragmatic 
dimensions of Jizang’s thought. Their stance somehow echoes that of a 
number of contemporary scholars of Indian Madhyamaka, who hold that 
Nāgārjuna’s insistence on the groundlessness of all things invalidates 
any positing of a higher metaphysical reality in the system. Nevertheless, 
Jizang usually refers approvingly to the Way without directly equating it 
with some subjective state, and for him, though words have a therapeu-
tic use, they also function as an expedient device that can indicate the 
ineffable principle.22 He clearly characterizes the Way as real, and when 
he appears to repudiate the Way or the like, he may be repudiating the 
linguistic determination imposed thereon or any conceptual acquisition 
thereof. All this seems to indicate that he acknowledges the existence of 
some real ineffable principle. Thus, we face a problem similar to that 
which we encountered in Nāgārjuna and Sengzhao concerning the onto-
logical status of supreme truth. 
We saw in Section 2 that Sengzhao takes nirvāṇa to be an indetermi-
nable nondual state of complete quiescence, wherein both oneself and 
things are undifferentially equal and harmoniously one, and this seems 
to be what he has in mind when speaking of supreme truth. This point 
provides us a valuable clue for resolving our problem. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
22 I am referring to Jizang’s employment of the famous simile of a finger pointing to the 
moon. A related issue concerns how one can say of something, without contradiction, 
that it is unsayable. For discussion of these two issues, see Ho, 2008. 
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To begin with, Jizang occasionally refers, approvingly, to the a-
bove-quoted Zhao lun passage to explicate the notion of nirvāṇa, which 
he identifies with the Way. In addition, commenting on MMK 18.9, he ap-
pears to rephrase the passage to explain the notion of the Real:23 
By getting rid of the two kinds of linguistic fabrication, one knows 
that things [in reality] have no different forms of existence and non-
existence, and the mind has no conception of existence and nonexis-
tence. Thus…there is no [objectifying] mind within…no figure without. 
Both [interior and exterior] are quiescently ceased, and both alike at-
tain to a great equality. This is named the Real. 
It seems plausible that Jizang follows Sengzhao closely in taking the Real 
to be an ineffable nondual quiescence wherein both oneself and things 
are equal and conceptually undifferentiated. 
In fact, Jizang’s phrasing is much less Daoistic than Sengzhao’s, and he 
does not stress the harmonious oneness of oneself and things as Seng-
zhao does. However, Jizang, like Sengzhao and other Sanlun thinkers 
before him, approaches the issue from the subject-object perspective. He 
frequently refers to a state in which both interior and exterior, appre-
hension and apprehended, have ceased, becoming quiescent. This, for 
him, is one significant point that distinguishes the Buddhist from the 
non-Buddhist teaching: “The outsiders [Confucians and Daoists] do not 
realize the abeyance of both object and cognition, while the insiders 
[Buddhists] have reached the quiescence of both the apprehended and 
apprehension.”24 Alternatively, he speaks of the nonduality of object 
and cognition. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
23 Zhongguan lun shu, T42:1824.128a8–11: 既無二種戲論，則知法無有無之異，心無有無
分別…無心於內…無數於外。彼此已寂滅，浩然大均，名為實相. In his Zhao lun (T45:‌
1858.161a15), Sengzhao uses the phrase “both alike attain to a great equality” (浩然大
均) to describe nirvāṇa. 
24 San lun xuanyi, T45:1852.2a13–14: 外未境智兩泯，內則緣觀俱寂. See also Jingming 
xuan lun, T38:1780.870a8–11, 871c12–21. 
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For Jizang, the notion of the middle requires that one transcend both 
the (one-sided) subjective and objective dimensions of human experi-
ence. Thus, he comments on MMK 1.8:25 
The real subtle dharma lies beyond object and cognition. As it lies be-
yond object, there is no object to be apprehended; as it lies beyond 
cognition, there is nothing that apprehends…being neither the appre-
hended nor apprehension…[the Real] is provisionally named the mid-
dle. 
The fact is probably not that no reality is really real, but that the Real is 
nowhere apprehensible in a conceptual experience. Surely, what is tran-
scended here is the cognitive mind, not the mind of nonacquisition. 
However, while the Way can be indicated as a nondependent mental 
state of nonacquisition, to reduce the former to the latter would be to 
fall one-sidedly on the subjective dimension, which does not tally well 
with Jizang’s emphasis on the nonduality of subject and object. 
The discussion so far may suggest that the Way is completely quies-
cent and negative. However, Jizang also holds that if one approaches the 
Way with an attitude of nonacquisition, it is virtually the same as the 
myriad things:26 
Because the great way of equality is ubiquitously nonabiding, all [its 
determinations] are to be negated. Because it is ubiquitously nonhin-
dering, all things can be equated with it. If one views affirmation as 
affirmation, and negation as negation, all affirmations and negations 
are to be negated. If one knows that there is no affirmation or non-‌af-
firmation, no negation or non-negation, that they are only provision-
ally said to be so and so, then, all affirmations and negations are to be 
affirmed. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
25 Zhongguan lun shu, T42:1824.50c14−51a2: 真實微妙法者，此法絕於境智。以絕境故，
無境可緣；絕於智故，無有能緣…非緣、非觀…強名為中. 
26 Dasheng xuan lun, T45:1853.42a28−b3: 平等大道無方無住故，一切並非，無方無礙故，
一切並得。若以是為是、以非為非者，一切是非並皆是非也。若知無是無非是、無
非無不非，假名為是非者，一切是非並皆是也. 
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As the Way is nonabiding, it is neither exclusively the exterior nor the 
interior, but both at once. It is quiescent and negative, primarily because 
all conceptual determinations have ceased or are negated in relation to 
it. Herein, the myriad things are not erased; rather, they are conceptual-
ly undifferentiated. This partially explains the aforesaid nonduality of 
the middle (the Way) and the provisional (the myriad things). In line 
with this nonduality, Jizang contends that, for a sage, the quiescence of 
both the apprehended and apprehension goes hand in hand with the ap-
parent manifestation of object and cognition.27 
According to Jizang, the myriad things are ontologically indetermi-
nate in that nothing is endowed with a determinate form or nature. Ano-
ther aspect of his philosophy of ontic indeterminacy is that the ineffable 
Way is fully indeterminable, which reinforces our attribution of the in-
determinacy thesis to Jizang. As the Way is indeterminable and non-
abiding, all its conceptual determinations are to be negated; it cannot be 
determined as X or non-X, say, as empty or nonempty, as Buddha-nature 
or non-Buddha-nature. In addition, it cannot be confined to the subjec-
tive or objective dimension of human experience. It supposedly contains 
all things in an undifferentiated nondual state of quiescence. Once this is 
understood, one can indirectly and provisionally refer to the Way as 
empty or nonempty, and so forth. Presumably, this allows Jizang to 
speak of it sometimes objectively and sometimes subjectively, which 
makes it difficult to ascertain his genuine stance. We see here that Ji-
zang’s conception of ontic indeterminacy is closely related to the issue of 
the nature of the Way. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
27 The corresponding Chinese sentence is: 至人緣觀俱寂，而境智宛然; see Jingming 
xuan lun, T38:1780.867b15−16. Jizang then echoes a line from the Zhao lun by stating 
that “as [the sage’s] response gets more active, his spirit becomes more tranquil; as his 
cognition gets more quiescent, the illumination [of his mind] becomes more brilliant” 
(應愈動，神愈靜，智愈寂，照愈明). This reminds us of the Dao de jing (道德經) formula 
of “doing nothing and yet doing all things” (無為無不為). 
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5 
In this paper, I have, in light of Sengzhao’s discussion on nirvāṇa, inter-
preted Jizang’s puzzling notion of the Way. In my opinion, Jizang’s onto-
logical system can roughly be said to consist of two interwoven layers: 
the layers of the middle and of the provisional. The middle is the concep-
tually indeterminable nondual quiescence of oneself and things, which is 
known, above all, as the Way. It is only revealed in fully nonconceptual 
experience and is indicated to be forgetting speech and ceasing thought. 
It harbors within itself the myriad things in their undifferentiated state. 
The middle is intimately interwoven with the provisional, which com-
prises the myriad things in their conceptually differentiated and interde-
pendent mode. Though empty of determinate form and nature, the 
things are properly and directly expressible in provisional language. 
Jizang does not clearly posit any nonempty metaphysical reality or 
principle. He does speak of the Way or the like as nonempty (as well as 
empty). Here, however, one of his purposes is to highlight that the Way 
cannot be determined as empty. Another is to indicate that the Way can-
not be reduced to emptiness; after all, it contains within itself all things 
in their undifferentiated and quiescent state.28 The Way is not any real-
ity metaphysically higher than the myriad things. Although it is charac-
terized as real, it is nothing more than the ineffable quiescence wherein 
both oneself and external things are conceptually undifferentiated. 
On the other hand, while we should respect the practical spirit in 
Jizang’s writing, his notion of the Way does not merely concern a con-
scious state of freedom from any acquisition whatsoever. It does not 
seem correct to hold that all his truth-claims are corrective and prag-
matic instead of (indirectly) indicating the Way as well. The fact is that, 
-------------------------------------------------- 
28 Yang (1989: 153−155) accuses Jizang of deviating from Indian Madhyamaka by endors-
ing the view of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra that nirvāṇa is not empty. See San lun xuanyi, 
T45:1852.4b1–4. Cf. Zhongguan lun shu, T42:1824.160a8−11: “The middle way is also 
named nirvāṇa…because therein all encumbrances have ceased and all virtues are ful-
filled…As all virtues are fulfilled, it is said to be nonempty; as all encumbrances have 
ceased, it is designated as empty” (中道亦名涅槃者，以…累無不寂，德無不圓…德無
不圓，名為不空，累無不寂，稱之為空). Here, as elsewhere in Jizang’s writing, the 
word “empty” also connotes the sense of nonexistence. 
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for him, the Way is only realized when one’s mind ceases to approach 
things in a spirit of acquisition;29 being beyond conceptual determina-
tion and attachment, it is accessible only to a mind of nonacquisition. 
Needless to say, the Way is also the preeminent source of soteriological 
value, the realization of which, according to Jizang, abolishes linguistic 
fabrication and the wheel of suffering. 
There are merits in Jizang’s notion of the Way as elucidated here, 
although it is hardly attractive to an analytical mind. In line with a philo-
sophical reconstruction of his thought, we may take the notion to point 
to a pre-subjective, pre-objective experience of nonacquisition. This 
nondual experience is equally correlated with the mind and the world of 
things, yet irreducible to either. Being ineffable and conceptually undif-
ferentiated, it is still nothing like our quotidian experience, but then, 
this follows inevitably from its putative soteriological functions. Mean-
while, Jizang’s philosophy of ontic indeterminacy is intriguing and wor-
thy of further investigation. However, exploring these issues would re-
quire a separate effort, which must wait for another occasion. 
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